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Abstract. In the absence of pre-established coordination structures, what can a 
self-governed entity – i.e. an entity that chooses on its own between its possible 
actions and cannot be controlled externally – do to evoke another self-governed 
entity’s cooperation? In this paper, the motivating conditional self-commitment 
is conceived to be the basic mechanism to solve coordination problems of this 
kind. It will be argued that such commitments have an inherent tendency to 
become more and more generalized and institutionalised. The sociological 
concept of generalized symbolic media is reinterpreted as a concept that focuses 
on this point. The conceptual framework resulting from the considerations is 
applicable to coordination problems between human actors as well as to 
coordination problems between artificial agents in open multi-agent systems. 
Thus, it may help to transfer solutions from one realm to the other. 
1 Introduction 
Coordination is the central theme for multi-agent research (cf. Van de Velde/Perram 
1996: VIII). The key problem in this research area centres around ensuring 
coordination between agents (cf. Jennings 1996: 187). This problem is caused by the 
basic characteristics of agents: autonomy and pro-activeness. According to a well-
known definition, agents are “hardware or (more usually) software-based computer 
system(s)” (ibid.) with at least these two properties: They operate autonomously 
“without the direct intervention of humans or others, and have some kind of control 
over their actions and internal state” (ibid.). And they function pro-actively, meaning 
that they “do not simply act in response to their environment”, but “are able to exhibit 
goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative” (ibid.). Humans in important respects 
can also be considered autonomous and pro-active entities and human societies have 
accumulated some thousand years of experience confronting coordination problems 
relating to autonomy and pro-activeness. Therefore, it is a promising idea to develop 
inter-agent coordination in analogy to forms of human interaction, which have proved 
to be successful. 
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However, to avoid that this analogy remains only metaphorical, we need to develop 
sufficiently precise concepts to define the common ground from which coordination 
in human as well as in agent interaction may evolve. In this paper, a general 
framework for dealing with coordination problems between self-governed entities will 
be provided. The basic suggestion is to conceive the initial situation of double 
contingency between self-governed entities, whose only means to affect others’ 
behaviour is to make commitments, to be this common basis. This paper will show 
how conditional commitments can be employed by an entity to motivate another self-
governed entity into responding cooperatively. Yet, this solution contains many 
restrictions. In adapting the concept of generalized symbolic media of interaction (or 
communication) to the problem of coordination, the emergence of generalized and 
institutionalised forms of commitments will be introduced as a means to overcome 
some of these restrictions. However, we will see that this general framework does not 
apply to closed multi-agent systems, since under the condition of closed systems less 
elaborate ways to deal with coordination problems are available and sufficient. On the 
other hand it is all the more important with respect to coordination problems in open 
multi-agent systems. Here, the analogy based on the common ground assumption 
works pretty well. In conclusion, I point out to the need for extending the analogy to 
hybrid systems. 
2 Coordination in the Face of Double Contingency: Motivating 
Conditional Commitments 
In the absence of given coordination rules or procedures, self-governed entities – i.e. 
entities that choose on their own between their possible actions – face a particular 
coordination problem when they aim to mutually adjusting their actions. This problem 
is defined by the initial situation of double contingency. Talcott Parsons and 
collaborators describe this situation with respect to two entities, ego and alter, as 
follows: „On the one hand ego’s gratifications are contingent on his selection among 
available alternatives. But in turn, alter’s reaction will be contingent on ego’s 
selection and will result from a complementary selection on alter’s part.“ (Parsons et 
al. 1951: 16). First of all, the behaviour of both parties involved is contingent on their 
own selections. Moreover, if alter is part of ego’s relevant environment and vice versa 
– that is, part of the environment the respective entity takes into account when 
choosing its own behaviour – then one entity’s selections are contingent on the 
selections of the other one. Thus, from the perspective of ego – the entity that wants 
to start a sequence of coordinated interaction – the situation of double contingency 
implies a double uncertainty: Ego does not know which behaviour to choose because 
it does not know which behaviour alter will choose in reaction to its action. 
With respect to the goal of achieving coordination, the double uncertainty that 
accompanies situations of double contingency leads to a deadlock. If coordination is 
defined as establishing situations where two or more entities select their actions in a 
suitable way to commonly produce certain results, then the effect of this double 
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uncertainty is to prevent coordinated behaviour.2 Hence, deadlock can only be broken 
through reducing uncertainty. At least the behaviour of one entity must become 
predictable to a certain degree so the other entity can rely on it while choosing its 
behaviour. However, one has to remember that we are dealing with self-governed 
entities. This means only the respective entity itself can make its own behaviour 
predictable. For a self-governed entity, the only means to do so is through self-
commitment. For example, ego may announce:3 “I commit myself to perform the 
action P every time I will be in the situation S.” From alter’s point of view such a self-
commitment on the part of ego may or may not be useful: Alter will welcome ego’s 
commitment if ego’s action P contributes to what alter wants to achieve in the 
situation S. But as long as ego makes its commitment under the condition of 
uncertainty about alter’s selections it is more probable that for alter this action P is 
without use. 
From ego’s point of view, an even more crucial problem is that this commitment 
does not – or only by chance – make alter cooperate with respect to ego’s goals. Let 
us assume that ego is interested in the result produced by the combination of its action 
P and alter’s action Q in the situation S. By fulfilling the self-commitment ego will do 
its part to bring about this result. But so far there is no reason why this commitment 
should enhance the probability of alter to react by performing the action Q. 
Consequently, ego runs the risk of constantly investing resources (by performing 
action P each time situation S comes around) without achieving its desired results. 
Upon reflection, ego may avoid this useless waste of resources by narrowing the self-
commitment as follows: “I commit myself to perform action P in situation S on 
condition that you, alter, perform action Q.’4 Does such a conditional commitment 
solve the coordination problem? The answer is yes, but only if alter as well as ego is 
interested in the results stemming from the combination of actions P and Q. In this 
case, if alter estimates ego to be trustworthy, it will perform action Q followed (if this 
estimation was appropriate) by ego’s action P. But without such coinciding interests, 
again, alter is not inclined to cooperate. 
As long as the entities involved cannot rely on given coincidences of interests, 
there is only one way to solve the remaining coordination problem: by producing such 
coincidences. But since a self-governed entity can affect the behaviour of other self-
governed entities only by making commitments, producing coinciding interests has to 
be achieved by making commitments. Thus, the general strategy towards producing 
coinciding interests lies in ego to commit itself to act in the interests of alter (or to 
commit itself to refrain from acting against alter’s interests) on condition that alter 
                                                          
2  As I will argue below, the coordination problem resulting from the situation of double 
contingency is not only a problem of harmonizing actions with respect to common or 
complimentary goals but at first a problem of establishing common or complimentary goals. 
For this reason, I use the term coordination in a much broader sense than it is used for 
example by Esser (2000: 59-71). 
3  To simplify matters I will assume that the entities in question are able to use a common 
language. This is obviously a nontrivial assumption. But since the problem at hand is not 
how a common understanding between self-governed entities can occur but the problem of 
their coordination, this simplification seems to be justified. 
4  Or if action P has to be performed first: ‘I commit myself to perform action P in situation S 
on condition that you, alter, commit yourself to perform action Q.’ 
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does something ego is interested in (or refrains from acting against ego’s interests). 
Let us assume that ego is interested in alter’s action Q (which in combination with 
ego’s continued actions will lead to a result it aims at) and that ego has reasons to 
believe that alter may be interested in its action P (which is, as we as godlike 
observers of the scene know, an appropriate assumption, since ego’s action P in 
combination with alter’s further actions will lead to a result alter aims at). By 
announcing: “I commit myself to perform action P on condition that you perform 
action Q.” ego not only makes its own behaviour more predictable to alter but at the 
same time it tries to make alter’s behaviour more predictable to itself. That is, the self-
commitment now aims at reducing uncertainty from both sides of the double 
contingency problem. This is done by transforming the initial situation where only 
ego has an interest in alter to act in a specific way into a situation where alter has also 
an interest to act in this way, namely the interest in thereby bringing about ego’s 
action P. And even though ego and alter’s interests in alter’s action Q are different, 
they are now coinciding interests in the sense that both parties are interested in alter 
performing action Q. 
However, a number of preconditions have to be met so that such a self-
commitment will work as described. First of all, ego requires certain resources at its 
disposal, resources allowing ego to change the situation in question to alter’s 
advantage or disadvantage (and the same applies to alter with respect to the resources 
required to react as ego wants this entity to). Second, ego needs sufficiently reliable 
knowledge about alter’s interests. Otherwise ego would not know how to use its 
resources to alter’s advantage or disadvantage. Lastly, alter needs to trust ego’s 
commitment towards the intended action. Alter will only be motivated to react 
accordingly when alter places confidence in ego’s promised behaviour. None of this 
preconditions is trivial. Ego may or may not possess the resources necessary for 
motivating alter (and alter may or may not possess the resources required to adopt 
ego’s proposal). And, in the positive case, ego may not know enough about alter’s 
interests to employ its resources successfully. Even when ego holds the relevant 
resources at its disposal and knows how to motivate alter through the resources, alter 
could doubt ego’s commitment, rendering ego’s resources and knowledge useless. As 
we will see, all these preconditions push towards standardizing, generalizing, and 
institutionally framing such motivating conditional commitments to become more 
efficient means of coordination. 
3 The General Framework as an Intermediary 
When speaking about self-governed entities in the preceding section, I have avoided 
to specify the nature of the entities I have in mind. So far, I have only defined the 
entities as those able to choose between possible actions on their own. Speaking about 
possible actions implies that these entities have certain resources at their disposal that 
enable them to act in one or another way. The term “action” is only meant to 
designate a change in the entity’s or its environment’s state brought about by this 
entity. The preceding considerations also imply that these entities have interests in the 
sense that their self-governed behaviour is directed at the attainment or avoidance of 
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certain future states of affairs; that they are able to make plans that include actions on 
the part of other entities in order to realize or prevent these future states; that to this 
end they are able to reflect on their own interests as well as on the presumptive 
interests of other entities; that they are able to employ the concept of self-
commitment; and that all interaction takes place under the rule of double contingency, 
meaning that no given structures guide the interaction. 
Defining the initial situation in this way, the main intention was to choose a level 
of abstraction suitable to serve as a point of departure for dealing with both the 
problem of coordination between human actors (or corporative actors) as well as with 
the problem of coordination between autonomous software agents. Moreover, this 
general framework is intended to act as an intermediary between both realms of 
coordination problems. To this end it has been conceptualised so as to lie in between 
both of them. That is, some aspects apply more to human actors than to software 
agents. For example, pursuing interests and reflecting on presumptive interests of 
others are properties we usually assume an average competent human actor to 
possess. In contrast, software agents must first be programmed to possess any 
capabilities. But today certain agent architectures exist, especially the so called BDI 
agent architectures (cf. Shoham 1993; Haddadi/Sundermeyer 1996), that allow for 
implementing agents, which approximately show such properties. Hence, the 
assumptions in this respect are not altogether unrealistic. 
On the other hand, some aspects of the general framework more appropriately 
describe the properties of software agents than those of human actors. This is the case 
with the absence of given structures. Since any structure guiding the agents’ 
interaction must be pre-programmed by the designers of the respective multi-agent 
system, at first no structures exist that reduce the double contingency problem. 
Human actors, in contrast, grow up within given societies. From the individual’s point 
of view the society is prior to him or her (cf. Mead 1967). Thus, there are always 
given social structures (cf. Durkheim 1982) reducing double contingency and possibly 
serving as coordination mechanisms. But if we are interested in understanding how 
such coordination mechanisms once came into existence and since we have all 
reasons to believe that they are constantly at risk to newly emerging uncertainties, our 
general framework seems to be a (to a certain degree counterfactual but nonetheless) 
useful point of departure for analysing the problem of coordination between human 
actors, too. 
4 Motivating Conditional Commitments in Human Interaction 
In the following section, I will apply the general framework to the problem of 
coordination between human actors. I shall counterfactually assume a situation of 
pure double contingency with respect to coordination issues within a certain 
population of human actors. In the absence of any pre-established coordination 
mechanisms, how may one actor (ego) gain another actor’s (alter’s) cooperation by 
means of motivating conditional commitments? 
One way is to draw upon physical strength as a resource (or upon resources 
enhancing ego’s capabilities to use physical force, such as weapons or other actors 
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ready to fight under ego’s command) and to threaten to use it to alter’s disadvantage. 
A respective self-commitment could run as follows: “I commit myself to harm you, 
unless you obey my orders.” If, according to alter’s estimation, ego possesses the 
resources required to make his threat come true (i.e. a physical strength or additional 
resources superior to his own), if alter believes ego will really use them accordingly, 
if alter possesses the resources required to obey, and if the threatened harm from the 
point of view of alter is more unfavourable than his obedience, then there is a good 
chance that alter will choose to obey, so that ego’s self-commitment will result in 
alter’s cooperation. 
But perhaps ego wants to avoid the risk of alter’s retaliation. He or she may be 
unsure of the own strength compared to alter’s or may not see the coordination issue 
as worth the risk at all. Under these circumstances ego might prefer to motivate alter’s 
cooperation by offering resources in return. Correspondingly, ego could announce: “I 
commit myself to place certain of my resources at your disposal on condition that you 
transfer certain of your resources to me.” Again, if alter believes that ego really 
possesses the offered resources and trusts in his or her self-commitment, if alter has 
the resources at his disposal demanded by ego, and if from the point of view of alter 
getting those resources of ego serves his interests better than not giving away those 
resources of his own, then there is a good chance that alter will accept ego’s proposal. 
However, there are coordination problems of considerable relevance to human 
actors, which can not easily be solved by exchanging resources or by threat of force. 
This is the case when coordination requires participants to share common (or 
complementary) orientations. For example, if ego happens to be attracted to alter, 
much of their future interaction will depend on whether or not alter comes to feel the 
same. Or, if ego counts on alter to feel morally obliged to respond to him or her in a 
certain way, the participants’ moral agreement is the basis for their coordination. 
Otherwise, the coordination rests on alter accepting as true, what ego holds to be true. 
Even though in these three cases the common (or complementary) orientations are 
different with respect to their content: truth, values or affective attitudes, the basic 
coordination problem is the same: To establish a certain kind of common or 
complementary orientations as a precondition of coordination. 
For the time being, we want to do without referring to pre-established normative 
orientations – Parsons’ solution to the problem of double contingency (cf. Luhmann 
1984: 148-151). Moreover, we want to do without any given structure facilitating 
coordination (such as common knowledge or common affective attitudes). Thus, 
ego’s request to adopt a certain aspect of his world view poses a problem to alter. 
Even if alter is sufficiently confident to gain his share of a successful cooperation 
based on his adoption of ego’s orientation (this will be a necessary subject of ego’s 
self-commitment), he can not know whether or not he is well advised at all to follow 
ego’s suggestions. Therefore, ego has all reasons to try to convince alter of the truth 
of his assertions, the moral rightness of his convictions or the veracity of his feelings 
(you will have recognized the three Habermasian validity claims of communicative 
action, cf. Habermas 1987, Vol. I: 410-427). 
To achieve this, self-commitments unfortunately are of limited help, since ego’s 
statements are only subjective whereas alter should prefer to obtain objective 
information. Nevertheless, there is one thing ego by means of self-commitments can 
do: Demonstrating alter his persuasion concerning the truth, rightness or veracity of 
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his suggestions by committing himself to bear the consequences following from them. 
With respect to claims of truth this means for ego to commit himself to assume 
responsibility for the reliability of his assertions, e.g. to commit himself to 
compensating alter for damages that may occur if his knowledge turns out to have 
been unreliable. In doing so, ego places a kind of a bet on the reliability of his 
assertions, thereby disclosing the degree to which he himself is convinced (a strategy 
already recommended by Kant to assess a persons subjective persuasion, cf. Kant 
1956: B 849f.; Krohn 2003). Under the condition that there is no other way to verify 
ego’s assertions, such a commitment may serve as an auxiliary proof and motivate 
alter to adopt them. With respect to moral convictions, ego can demonstrate to alter 
his own persuasion by committing himself to obey to the values he wants to establish 
and, additionally, by committing himself to treat alter as if he, too, was subject to 
them. If ego believably exemplifies his moral convictions through his own behaviour 
and if alter for whatever reasons has an interest in being deemed to be a respectable 
person according to ego’s moral standards, self-commitments of this kind may 
enhance the chance of alter to adopt ego’s convictions. And with respect to feelings of 
relatedness, affection, and solidarity all ego can do is to make self-commitments to 
the effect that he will act according to those feelings, hoping thus to motivate alter to 
reciprocate. 
Obviously, the success of all these attempts to initiate coordinated interaction by 
using motivating conditional commitments depends on many “ifs”, particularly when 
coordination requires commonly shared or complementary orientations. But attempts 
to coordinate actions by threat of force or by exchange of resources include 
considerable uncertainties and restrictions, too. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the chances of success could be enhanced substantially if not all these prerequisites 
have to be established anew, each time such a self-commitment is made. This is 
where the concept of generalized symbolic media comes into play. 
5 Generalized Symbolic Media of Coordination 
Parsons introduces the concept of generalized symbolic media in order to describe a 
“family of mechanisms” (Parsons 1963a: 42), which have in common that they are 
“ways of getting results in interaction” (ibid.) by “fac(ing) the object with a decision, 
calling for a response” (ibid.). According to Parsons, within the social system, this 
family of mechanisms comprises of four generalized media: money, political power, 
influence, and value-commitments (cf. Parsons 1975: 94-95). These “mechanisms are 
ways of structuring intentional attempts to bring about results by eliciting the 
response of other actors to approaches, suggestions, etc. In the case of money, it is a 
matter of offers; in the case of power, of communicating decisions that activate 
obligations; in the case of influence, of giving reasons or ‘justifications’ for a 
suggested line of action.” (Parsons 1963a: 42). Starting from Parsons’ concept of 
generalized symbolic media of interaction, Luhmann has developed a concept of 
symbolically generalized media of communication, where he arrives at a somewhat 
different list: In his opinion, besides money and power, truth and love are the most 
elaborated generalized media in modern societies. Additionally he considers religious 
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belief, art and basic civil values to be rudimentary forms (cf. Luhmann 1975: 176-
179; 1984: 222; 1997: 332-358). But with respect to the role they play as mechanisms 
to coordinate the actors’ selections (cf. Luhmann 1997: 320), his view on the 
generalized media resembles Parsons’ perspective: They allow to condition the 
respective selection “so that it works as a means of motivation, that is, so that it can 
adequately secure acceptance of the selection” (Luhmann 1984: 222). 
Both Parsons’ and Luhmann’s description correspond to the way in which the 
motivating conditional commitment works as a means of coordination. Thus, the 
question arises what is the difference and what is the advantage if an actor draws upon 
one of the generalized symbolic media when trying to motivate other actors to adopt 
his or her selections. Indeed, there is a certain similarity to the use of self-
commitments as described above. But this is not so amazing, since proposing a 
selection with reference to one of these media is nothing else but making a motivating 
conditional commitment. In this respect no difference exists between an actor offering 
money in exchange for certain goods or services and another actor trying to arrive at 
the same result through a barter exchange. In both cases the respective actor, ego, 
attempts to motivate alter to agree to a certain transaction by committing himself or 
herself to transfer to alter something of value on condition that alter responds 
according to this request. 
In other respects, however, drawing upon generalized symbolic media makes a 
difference. By referring to them, the possible success of attempting coordinated 
interaction is considerably enhanced. This is due to two basic properties of these 
media: generalization and symbolization. As indicated above, the success of the 
motivating conditional commitment alone is always in danger from the problems and 
restrictions posed by the particular circumstances of the prospective participants’ 
individual situation. Drawing upon one of the generalized symbolic media, in this 
respect has the effect of transforming the concrete situation into an instance of a much 
more general situation, thereby overcoming at least some of these problems and 
restrictions. The term ‘symbolization’ refers to the fact that by using one of these 
media, the means to elicit a certain response is not the relevant resource itself, but a 
symbolic representation thereof. Again, one effect is decontextualisation, and to the 
degree this is the case, the generalized symbolic media are symbolically generalized 
media. Additionally, but not less important, the emergence of symbolic 
representations of this kind comes along with the emergence of institutional 
arrangements, whose function is to make sure that these symbolic representations 
work as if the ‘real’ resources, they stand for, were present (cf. Parsons 1975: 96). 
This, in turn, has the effect of simplifying matters, since some of the prerequisites for 
successful coordination now no longer have to be brought about by the prospective 
participants themselves, but can be left to these institutional arrangements. 
The paradigmatic case of a generalized symbolic medium is money (cf. Parsons 
1975: 94). In order to illustrate how the media’s properties of generalization and 
symbolization can contribute to overcome problems of coordination, I will look at the 
case of money first. One of the major problems of barter trade is that the actor, who 
offers a certain commodity in exchange for another commodity, not only must find 
someone, who is interested in the offered commodity, but someone, who additionally 
is capable and ready to provide the desired commodity for exchange (cf. Coleman 
1990: 119; Esser 1993: 557-558). Obviously, this problem of “double coincidence of 
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wants” (Coleman 1990: 119) is the greater the more uncommon the commodities in 
question are. But basically, this is a problem inherent in each attempt at making a 
barter exchange since the occurrence of coinciding complementary offers and 
requests is more or less unlikely on condition that each party is characterized by its 
own individual constellation of disposable and desired resources. 
Money deals with this problem, since money, as Coleman puts it, “enables two 
parties to break apart the two halves of the double coincidence of a barter transaction. 
For example, B can engage in one half of the transaction with A, by providing 
services to A (in return for money), and then engage in the second half with C, who 
provides B with services ‘in return’ for those B provides to A (concretely in return for 
money B earlier received from A). B need not discover a D, who both needs what he 
can provide and has what he needs.” (Coleman 1990: 120) In this way, money helps 
overcome a major impediment to economic exchange: “the fact that at any given time 
and place only one party of a pair who might engage in a transaction has an interest in 
what the other party has” (ibid.: 121). When dividing the transaction into two halves, 
money transforms a situation which is relatively specific and therefore relatively 
unlikely to occur into a situation that is much more general and therefore much more 
likely to occur: The resource that is offered in return for the desired commodity is 
now a resource everyone has an interest in, at least everyone who has interests in any 
commodities different from the ones already at his or her disposal. This is because the 
resource offered, a certain amount of money, represents exchange value, that is, the 
generalized capacity to exchange it for a certain amount of any commodity offered for 
money. In addition to this property to mediate exchange by serving as a general 
equivalent form of value (cf. Marx 1971 <1890>: 83-85), money has at least two 
further properties which by generalization of the situation help to enhance the chances 
of exchanges to occur: The property to be used as a store of value, and its property to 
function as a measure of value. The property of money as a store of value allows 
temporally to separate the single exchanges within an overall transaction: Because of 
this property an actor may be ready to provide a certain commodity in return for 
money at a given time even if the exchange for which he wants to employ this money 
will take place only some time later. Thus, the use of money not only allows to break 
up the double coincidence of actors complementary offering and looking for certain 
commodities, but the temporal aspect of this coincidence, too. And last but not least, 
the property of money as a measure of value “makes goods and services …, which in 
other respects such as physical properties are incomparably heterogeneous, 
comparable” (Parsons 1975: 95) and therefore much more easy to exchange. 
In contrast to commodity money, such as gold, spices, or cigarettes that have been 
used to represent value, modern money no longer contains its value (in form of its 
value as a commodity), but merely symbolizes it. “It is symbolic in that, though 
measuring and thus ‘standing for’ economic value or utility, it does not itself possess 
utility in the primary consumption sense – it has no ‘value in use’ but only ‘in 
exchange’, i.e. for possession of things having utility.” (Parsons 1963b: 236). Modern 
fiat money, such as the dollar, is “’valueless’ money” (ibid.: 237), it “has no intrinsic 
utility, yet signifies commodities that do, in the special sense that it can in certain 
circumstances be substituted for them” (Parsons 1963a: 39). This feature of modern 
money – likewise to be abstracted from every commodity by only symbolizing value 
– “introduces new degrees of freedom” (ibid.: 40) in economic exchange, for example 
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because “money, unlike virtually all commodities, does not intrinsically deteriorate 
through time and has minimal, if any, costs of storage” (ibid.: 41). Hence, in the case 
of money, the positive effects of generalization are in part effects of symbolic 
generalization. 
Another, but not less important consequence of the evolution of modern money is 
its dependence upon the co-evolution of certain institutional structures. This is the 
case, because the property of modern money to symbolize value is based on another 
symbolic property of money: Its property to serve as a symbolic representation of 
self-commitments of trusted third parties. This applies to fiat money as well as to its 
precursor, fiduciary money.5 Fiduciary money represents a promise from its issuer 
(e.g. a bank or a trading house) to balance the debts it stands for, and fiat money is 
‘good’ only as long as the government keeps the “promise to maintain a balance 
between growth in goods and services and growth in money supply” (Coleman 1990: 
121). Thus, symbolic money requires in one or another way institutional arrangements 
securing the promise it embodies (i.e. its exchange value). Otherwise no one would 
accept intrinsically valueless money in exchange for intrinsically valuable 
commodities. But if trusted third parties of this kind do exist, a part of the 
commitments, which otherwise would have to be made by those engaged in a 
transaction can now be substituted by these trusted third parties’ promises. 
Consequently, less trust must be invested in the respective other party involved in the 
exchange, serving as a further contribution of this generalized symbolic medium to 
make economic exchange more likely to occur. 
If Parsons is right that money is only one, if perhaps the most prominent member 
of a “much more extensive family of media” (Parsons 1975: 94), and if it is 
appropriate to treat these media as media of coordination between actors,6 then 
similar effects of generalization and symbolization should also be observable with 
respect to other media. I will address the issue of power only very briefly, since 
coordination by means of power is of little importance within multi-agent research, as 
I will argue below. Afterwards, I will discuss the case of influence in more detail. 
Parsons describes power, in line with Weber, to be “the capacity of persons or 
collectives ‘to get things done’ effectively, in particular when their goals are 
obstructed by some kind of human resistance or opposition” (Parsons 1963b: 232). 
According to him, the difference between an attempt to obtain obedience by threat of 
force and the respective attempt by exercising power is comparable to the difference 
between a barter exchange and an exchange mediated by money: “Securing 
possession of an object of utility by bartering another object for it is not a monetary 
transaction. Similarly, … securing compliance with a wish … simply by threat of 
superior force, is not an exercise of power. … The capacity to secure compliance 
must, if it is to be called power in my sense, be generalized and not solely a function 
of one particular sanctioning act which the user is in a position to impose, and the 
medium used must be ‘symbolic’.” (Parsons 1963b: 237-238) Power, as well as 
                                                          
5  With respect to the distinction between commodity money, fiduciary money and fiat money 
see Coleman 1990: 119-120. 
6  And not only as media of communication in the sense that they mediate the autopoietic 
emergence of specialized social systems (what is Luhmann’s main focus, cf. Luhmann 1997: 
359-371) or as media of interchange between the functional subsystems of the society (what 
for Parsons is of major interest, cf. Schimank 2000: 110-117). 
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money, has a ‘real basis’: “For the case of power, the basis of unit security 
corresponding to economic ‘real asset’ consists in possession of effective means of 
enforcing compliance … through implementing coercive threats or exerting 
compulsion.” (Parsons 1963a: 47) Along with money, power is the generalized 
symbolic representation of this ‘real basis’. It is this generalization and symbolization 
of physical force that makes binding obligations more likely to occur: “(J)ust as 
possession of stocks of monetary gold cannot create a highly productive economy, so 
command of physical force alone cannot guarantee the effective fulfillment of 
ramified systems of binding obligations.” (ibid.) 
Without any symbolic representation of physical force, the only way for alter to 
determine if ego maintains the capability to enforce his compliance is to test ego’s 
physical force. But when ego was right in claiming superiority, the outcome of such a 
test is a disadvantage to both parties. Alter must face ego’s sanctions as consequence 
to his disobedience, a situation alter would have avoided were he informed in 
advance. And ego is compelled to employ his force although he would prefer gaining 
alter’s cooperation through deterrence. Power as a means to symbolize capabilities 
enforcing compliance in a generalized way, a way allowing a comparison between 
different amounts of such capabilities, helps to overcome such problems by enabling 
the participants to assess their relative capabilities in advance. However, in one 
respect, power as a coordination medium is substantially different from money. Power 
is not a medium in the sense that it intermediates between the parts of an overall 
transaction (cf. Esser 2000: 413-414). Normally, power is not a ‘currency’ that could 
be traded in exchange for compliance. Rather, it is a medium only in the sense that it 
makes it easier to grasp a special kind of relationship between actors: the power 
relation as the basis of coordination by dominance and submission. With respect to 
intermediating capacities, influence, the generalized medium I will turn to now, is 
much more similar to money than power can ever become. 
As we have seen, Parsons and Luhmann agree that money and power are 
generalized symbolic media, but disagree about the remaining media. According to 
Parsons these are influence and value-commitment, whereas Luhmann holds that 
truth, love, and to a certain degree, religious belief, art, and basic civil values 
additionally play the part of generalized media. I will argue – partially in accordance 
with Parsons (1963a: 51-58) – that all such media should be viewed as representing 
different types of influence so that the medium influence constitutes a kind of a sub-
family within the media family. Starting from a position that treats the generalized 
symbolic media as mechanisms to overcome coordination problems in situations 
where the motivating conditional commitment at first is the only means to initiate 
coordinated interaction, such an assumption makes some sense. As I have argued 
above, coordination on the basis of shared assertions of truth, of shared moral (or 
religious) beliefs, or of mutual feelings of affection (and, to include art: of shared 
aesthetic feelings) are similar, because in each case the establishment of one or 
another kind of a commonly shared (or complementary) perception of the particular 
situation at hand is the means to achieve coordination. In the absence of a pre-
established common ground this leads to the question of why alter should be 
motivated to adopt ego’s assertions, beliefs, etc. The admittedly unsatisfying answer I 
gave above refers to ego’s degree of persuasiveness. As we will see now, influence of 
one or another kind generalizes and symbolizes persuasiveness, thereby helping to 
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overcome certain problems and restrictions that arise when alter’s cooperation 
depends on his or her estimation that acting according to ego’s definition of the 
situation lies in his or her own interest. 
The crucial problem of coordination through adopting assertions, beliefs, or 
feelings lies in bringing about “a decision on alter’s part to act in a certain way 
because it is felt to be a ‘good thing’ for him, … for positive reasons, not because of 
obligations he would violate through noncompliance” (Parsons 1963a: 48). For 
example, if it is a matter of adopting a certain information, “there must be some basis 
on which alter considers ego to be a trustworthy source of information and ‘believes’ 
him even though he is not in a position to verify the information independently – or 
does not want to take the trouble” (ibid.). As I have argued above, ego’s commitment 
to bear the consequences following alter’s adoption of his suggestions may provide 
such a basis to a certain degree. But these self-commitments’ capacities to work in 
this way are limited: Alter is neither sure not to become subject to ego’s fraud, nor 
can he or she rule out that ego is mistaken even if he himself truly believes what he 
says. For both reasons, it would make alter’s decision easier if he or she could obtain 
more general knowledge about ego’s performance in comparable situations. Thus, it 
would help alter to assess ego’s trustworthiness in both respects, if he or she could 
relate the actual situation to prior experiences with ego in similar situations, or if he or 
she could find out to which degree other people feel positive about having adopted 
ego’s suggestions in similar situations. And if such comparisons turn out to confirm 
ego’s trustworthiness, ego will welcome them, since they enhance the persuasiveness 
of his suggestions. Influence of one or another kind can be understood to be the 
generalized symbolic medium that represents the accumulated perceptions of certain 
actors with respect to their trust in another actor’s capability and willingness to make 
suggestions that will improve their situation, if adopted. In this sense, “(i)nfluence is a 
means of persuasion” (ibid.). 
Since space is short, I will illustrate only one type of influence, namely scientific 
reputation. According to Merton, “graded rewards in the realm of science are 
distributed principally in the coin of recognition accorded research by fellow-
scientists. This recognition is stratified for varying grades of scientific 
accomplishment, as judged by the scientist’s peers.”(Merton 1968: 56) In 
characterizing recognition by fellow-scientists, that is, reputation within a scientific 
community, as “the coin of the scientific realm” (Merton 1957: 644), Merton implies 
it to bear analogy to money. The basis of this analogy is the observation that in 
science reputation has become “symbol and reward for having done one’s job well” 
(ibid.: 640). This leads to some questions: In which way is reputation a generalized 
symbolic media in the sense of an intrinsic valueless representation of something else 
of value? In which way does this medium help to overcome problems of 
coordination? And what does this currency buy? 
In the case of scientific reputation, to have intrinsic value would mean to contain 
scientific truth, what reputation certainly does not. Rather, reputation contains 
information about the capability of a scientist to produce information of scientific 
value, as judged by fellow-scientists. Compared with what the scientist in question 
concretely has contributed to science, this is a rather general information, since it 
represents the accumulated recognition of several of this scientist’s contributions by 
several of his fellow-scientists. And reputation is a symbolic representation, because it 
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does not somehow recapitulate or summarize the content of this scientist’s 
accomplishments, but merely symbolizes his peers’ estimation of how serious his 
contributions at large should be taken. 
According to Luhmann, the “plausibility of reputation” (Luhmann 1990: 246) 
depends on the assumption that reputation will be attributed according to scientific 
accomplishment. But as we have seen, reputation does not directly follow from a 
researcher’s contribution to science, but results from his fellow-scientists’ perceptions 
thereof. Hence, the question arises as to how to make sure that reputation sufficiently 
corresponds with actual accomplishment. One part of the answer lies in the self-
adjusting properties of reputation. If fellow-scientists involved in a particular research 
problem recommend referring to a certain scientist’s contributions and other 
scientists, after following this recommendation came to the conclusion doing so was 
of no help, this will (at least in the long run) not only affect the recommended 
scientist’s reputation, but those fellow-scientists’ reputation, too. The fellow-scientists 
would appear to have given bad advice. In order not to compromise their reputation, 
scientists have a certain interest not to claim much more than their research really can 
contribute, and more general: an interest to live up to the expectations raised by the 
reputation they have already obtained.7 The same applies to recognition by fellow-
scientists. They, too, must be cautious not to misjudge other scientists’ 
accomplishments, in order to save their own reputation.8 In addition to this informal 
institutionalisation of the reputation mechanism, the referee system as a more formal 
mechanism to attribute scientific reputation has been established (cf. 
Zuckerman/Merton 1971). Like the institutions which are backing money, those 
informal or formal institutions’ function is to make sure that reputation becomes and 
remains a sufficiently adequate symbol to represent scientific accomplishment. 
In which way does reputation as a generalized symbolic medium help to overcome 
problems of coordination? As we have seen, the answer with respect to influence in 
general is that this medium communicates information about the presumptive quality 
of an actor’s suggestions, what is useful in situations where on the part of the 
addressee of such a suggestion it is either impossible or too costly to verify its quality 
independently. This applies to scientific reputation too: “Studies of the 
communication behavior of scientists have shown that, confronted with the growing 
task of identifying significant work published in their field, scientists search for cues 
to what they should attend to. One such cue is the professional reputation of the 
authors. The problem of locating the pertinent research literature and the problem of 
authors’ wanting their work to be noticed and used are symmetrical” (Merton 1968: 
59): Since the readers’ “behaviors in selecting articles” are, to a considerable degree, 
“based on the identity of the authors” (ibid.), their reputations, scientists must acquire 
                                                          
7  As Merton (1968: 57) observes with respect to Nobel laureates, “the reward system based on 
recognition for work accomplished tends to induce continued effort, which serves both to 
validate the judgment that the scientist has unusual capacities and to testify that these 
capacities have continual potential. … It is not necessarily the fact that their own Faustian 
aspirations are ever escalating that keeps eminent scientists at work. More and more is 
expected of them, and this creates its own measure of motivation and stress. Less often than 
might be imaged is there repose at the top in science.” 
8 This is a major reason of why a considerable part of the citations to be found in scientific 
texts refer to authors, whose scientific accomplishments are beyond doubt. 
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a reputation as a means of producing interest in their research results. To the extent to 
which reputation is a reliable indicator of scientific accomplishment, referring to it 
simplifies (cf. Luhmann 1990: 249) the scientists’ search for those contributions of 
other scientists that prospectively are most important to their own work. 
Thus, reputation helps to overcome coordination problems by supporting the 
allocation of scientific findings to those who will need them in their own research. 
Like money as a medium of economic exchange, reputation, too, enables two parties 
to break apart the two halves of a double coincidence: the double coincidence that the 
scientist looking for scientific findings useful for his work finds someone who is 
capable and ready to provide him with such findings. One half of the overall 
transaction consists of offering scientific findings to everyone who might be 
interested, i.e. of publishing them, in order to be rewarded by the fellow-scientists’ 
recognition. The other half of the transaction exploits reputation, which those who 
offer their findings already have accrued, to single out what appears to be most 
promising contributions and in turn to pay recognition to its’ authors if their findings 
actually turn out to be useful. Thus, from the perspective of those who pay 
recognition, reputation is a means to get authoritative advice with respect to their own 
scientific work. From the viewpoint of those attaining recognition, it is a means to 
strengthen their position “within the opportunity structure of science” (Merton 1968: 
57), that is, their chances of “access to the means of scientific production” (ibid.). In 
this sense, “status, or recognition from others … has a characteristic that makes it 
somewhat like money: The value of a particular act of deference from a person is 
proportional to his own status. It is as if he has a particular quantity of status and pays 
out a certain fraction of it through the act of showing deference to another.” (Coleman 
1990: 130-131) 
As we have seen, referring to generalized media has the effect of transforming 
particular coordination problems into instances of much more general ones, thereby 
reducing the need to meet the specific preconditions of the particular situation. The 
parties mutually have to know much less about their individual interests, strategies, 
capabilities, and trustworthiness, since part of what otherwise had to be negotiated 
between them now can be left to the respective generalized medium. Consequently, 
the generalized media are means of “disembedding”, that is, of “the ‘lifting out’ of 
social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space” (Giddens 1990: 21). By helping to overcome 
restrictions imposed by local social contexts and the limitations of co-presence, they 
are powerful means of coordination making even cooperation between complete 
strangers probable to occur. 
6 Bridging the Gap: Generalized Media as Emergent Effects of 
Conditional Commitments 
If we want to draw upon generalized media as a way to overcome problems of 
coordination between self-governed entities as characterized by the general 
framework description given above, one major problem still remains: the problem of 
how generalized media come into existence, starting from an initial situation where all 
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an entity can do to initiate coordination is to make motivating conditional 
commitments. It must be shown that from this initial situation at least some 
development towards generalization (and symbolization) of conditional commitments 
may occur. Otherwise it would be much less useful as a point of departure for 
considering solutions to problems of coordination between self-governed entities. 
Additionally, the general framework would lose much of its relevance as an 
intermediary, that is, as a basic concept that helps to transfer means of coordination 
between human actors to the realm of software agents. 
Luhmann (1975: 174; 1997: 316-317), in particular, emphasizes that generalized 
media result from self-reinforcing processes and counts on the possibility that such 
processes can be initiated by nothing more than one first suggestion of an actor to 
adopt his definition of the situation. This may happen as follows: “In a still uncertain 
situation alter decides tentatively to act in a certain way, as a first step. He starts with 
a friendly glance, a gesture, a gift – and then awaits ego’s reaction to the definition of 
the situation thus proposed. In the light of this first step each following action has the 
determinative effect of reducing contingency – whether it be in a positive or in a 
negative way.” (Luhmann 1984: 150) In the long run, such attempts at testing other 
actors’ reactions to suggestions of one or another kind leads to more reliable 
expectations of how they typically will react. The generalized media can be 
understood to represent reliable expectations regarding the prospective reactions of 
other actors to certain types of suggestions. Thus, the next step towards generalized 
media is disembedding expectations from their local contexts of origin, that is, their 
transformation into general patterns of orientation with respect to certain types of 
coordination problems. 
Even this next step can be deduced at least to a certain degree from the initial 
situation as characterized by the general framework. According to Esser (1993: 560-
561), successful solutions to problems are almost automatically adopted by other 
actors, since they see that they will be better off in doing so. Consequently, a 
successful selection changes the situation by affecting other selections, thus setting 
off a process by which general solutions to typical problems are developed and 
become institutionalised. Carl Menger’s outline of an ‘organic’ development of 
commodity money, to which Esser refers in this context, follows this pattern of 
explanation: according to Menger, it takes only a simple observation to solve the 
problem of double coincidence in barter exchanges, the problem that “not only does A 
have something that B wants, but it is also true that B has something that A wants, 
and both want what the other has more than they want what they themselves have, 
which they are willing to give up in exchange” (Coleman 1990: 119): Each individual 
can easily discover that some commodities, in comparison to others, are on greater 
demand. So, when looking for a certain commodity, it is more likely to find someone, 
who offers it, among the many, who themselves look for a marketable commodity 
than among the few, who look for a less marketable item. Thus, it is an obvious idea 
for anyone who offers a less marketable commodity to exchange it not only for the 
commodity he looks for, but – if this is not possible – also to exchange it for other 
commodities which he does not need but for which there is a greater demand than for 
his own commodity. In this way he gets nearer to his aim, since now he can look 
among the many, who are in demand for this commodity, for someone who offers 
what he wants. And if he is successful, a transaction mediated by this demanded 
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commodity has been performed. Based upon this solution of the double coincidence 
problem, everyone will prefer to possess among the highly demanded commodities 
those with the highest marketability, the least deterioration, and the best divisibility, 
thus paving the way for the development of commodity money whose primary 
function is to be a medium of exchange (cf. Menger 1969 <1883>: 174-176). 
In the same way, influence can be understood to result from aggregated and 
thereby generalized experiences with cooperation on the basis of conditional 
commitments. At least with respect to influence, as far as it is an informally 
institutionalised medium of coordination, this can be easily shown. An everyday 
experience serves as an appropriate example: When you have moved to a new place, 
how do you find a dentist, in whose skills you hope you can trust? Probably, you will 
ask your new neighbours or colleagues and follow their recommendations. The 
rationale behind this strategy is as follows: from the point of view of the neighbours 
or colleagues, the recommended dentist so far kept his promise to treat their dental 
problems successfully, otherwise they would not have recommended him. So, it 
seems likely that this dentist will be capable of dealing with other persons’ dental 
problems as well. Following the neighbours’ or colleagues’ recommendations means 
adopting a solution to a problem which has proved to be successful. At the same time, 
it implies a certain degree of generalization of this solution as a precondition of its 
transferability. The person who follows such recommendations, concludes from other 
persons’ individual experiences with this dentist’s capabilities to his competency in 
general. Or to put it another way: He refers to this dentist’s professional reputation as 
an indicator of his problem-solving capacity. 
To a certain degree even power can be conceived to emerge from the initial 
situation in which the motivating conditional commitment is the only means of 
coordination. This can be observed in situations where the physical means to enforce 
compliance are distributed relatively equally among the parties involved, but their 
readiness to actually employ them is not. In such situations those more willing to use 
force will often gain a capacity to secure compliance far beyond their relative physical 
strength, thus accumulating power as distinct from force. Nevertheless, the emergent 
qualities of power relations are limited, since the basis of this medium, that is, the 
“possession of effective means of enforcing compliance” (Parsons 1963a: 47), is less 
affected by exchanges mediated by power than it is in the case of money or influence, 
because power usually is not a circulating medium9 in the sense of transferring what it 
represents. Rather than to be an emergent effect of prior exchanges, the possession of 
such effective means primarily results from decisions of system-builders, for instance 
of those who found a company and delegate rights and resources to the different 
positions within this company. Thus, “designed institutions” rather than “emergent 
institutions” (cf. Conte 2001) are the basis of coordination mediated by power. 
                                                          
9 In this respect, Parsons (1963b: 245-246) argues to the contrary. 
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7 Generalized Media of Coordination in Closed Multi-agent 
Systems? 
In early stages of research in multi-agent systems one can already observe the 
implementation of coordination mechanisms, which at first glance resemble 
coordination by means of generalized media: The contract net protocol (Davis/Smith 
1983: 77) emulates a simple mechanism of economic exchange. It implements a 
coordination structure, where the agents involved possess the capabilities to announce 
tasks they want to be carried out by other agents, to “evaluate their own level of 
interest” (ibid.) in performing tasks announced by other agents, to submit bids 
according to these evaluations, to evaluate received bids and to select between them. 
Often a certain quality of the task itself – for example the amount of time the bidding 
agents state they will need to perform it – is used to evaluate them (cf. Schulz-
Schaeffer 2000: 30-32), but sometimes a more general measure of value, some kind of 
money, is used (cf. Wellman 1992). In both cases the respective coordination 
mechanism goes beyond barter exchange in that it employs a more or less generalized 
medium to make different offers (or different announcements) comparable. 
Coordination by identifying the agent that is best suited for performing the 
respective task in a population of agents with different expertise is another strategy 
often employed in multi-agent research. An early example of coordination structured 
by the agents’ particular skills is the distributed vehicle monitoring testbed (cf. 
Lesser/Corkhill 1983). In this case, the “spatially-distributed nodes detect the sound 
of vehicles, and each applies knowledge of vehicle sounds and movements to track a 
vehicle through its spatial area. Nodes then exchange information about vehicles they 
have tracked to build up a map of vehicle movements through the entire area.” 
(Durfee et al. 1989: 74) Another way to use an agent’s particular ability as basis of 
their coordination is not to refer to skills but to willingness. Much of the early multi-
agent research starts from the so called benevolent agent assumption: “Agents are 
assumed to be friendly agents, who wish to do what they are asked to do.” (Martial 
1992: 41) In this case coordination is brought about by the agents quality to be 
“perfectly willing to accommodate one another” (cf. Davis 1980: 42). 
Coordination by implementing means to secure compliance seems to play a part in 
every multi-agent system, but mostly in an implicit way. An explicit suggestion is 
Shohams and Tennenholtz’ idea of imposing social laws on agents. Taking the 
domain of mobile robots as their example, they argue: “Suppose robots navigate along 
marked paths, much like cars do along streets. Why not adopt a convention, or, as 
we’d like to think of it, a social law, according to which each robot keeps to the right 
of the path? If each robot obeys the convention, we will have avoided all head-on 
collisions without any need for either a central arbiter or negotiation.” 
(Shoham/Tennenholtz 1992: 277) But most multi-agent researchers do not like this 
idea very much. While they concede that it is indeed an effective way to overcome 
coordination problems, they fear that pre-programmed conventions or laws of this 
kind will reduce the autonomy and pro-activeness of the agents (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 
2000: 45-48) and thereby affect what is held to be the distinctive feature of this strand 
of research: coordination as an emergent effect of interaction between agents without 
a central authority. 
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Though these solutions at first glance seem to resemble coordination by means of 
generalized media, in fact they bear only a poor resemblance, because – as 
Castelfranchi puts it – the respective approaches in multi-agent research “still remain 
in a world of ‘pre-established harmonies’” (Castelfranchi 1990: 50; cf. 
Conte/Castelfranchi 1994: 268). At least within closed multi-agent systems, 
coordination is largely a result of predefined patterns of behaviour: The agents who 
are subject to rules, conventions, or social laws cannot act otherwise than to comply, 
the benevolent agents do not possess the option to act malevolently, the spatially or 
functionally distributed agents interact on the basis of given knowledge about their 
respective skills, and the agents announcing and bidding for tasks do not possess 
interests that could interfere with the performance of the overall exchange system. 
Closed multi-agent systems are characterized by the fact that the development and 
implementation of all agents involved, as well as of the system’s architecture (e.g. 
inter-agent relations, interaction protocols) are completely in the hands of one 
designer or designer team (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2000: 14). In this case, there is little 
reason why designers should provide agents with properties which pose impediments 
to coordination, then being forced to implement coordination mechanisms in order to 
overcome the coordination problems resulting from these properties. Why should they 
develop agents that are able to violate obligations, thereby raising the need to develop 
means to secure compliance? Why should they employ complicated reputation 
mechanisms to enable agents to evaluate their respective skills, if they possess 
complete knowledge about their agents’ capabilities because they have programmed 
them and could easily distribute this knowledge among the agents? The answer is, 
they will not, and they actually do not, when the aim is to develop agents, which 
efficiently coordinate their actions within closed multi-agent systems. Rather, multi-
agent researchers developing closed systems restrict their agents’ conduct in a 
functional way so that collaborative problem-solving necessary results from their pre-
programmed patterns of behaviour. Thus, coordination between agents in closed 
multi-agent systems differs from our general framework in that it heavily relies on 
pre-established structures. This does not mean that closed multi-agent systems cannot 
be modelled on human social systems. Since a large part of social interaction between 
human actors is very successfully governed by given social structures, quite the 
contrary is true. But it does mean that in closed multi-agent systems there is little need 
to refer to conditional commitments and to generalized forms of making commitments 
(i.e. generalized media) in order to ensure coordination. 
7 From Conditional Commitments to Generalized Media in 
Open Multi-agent Systems: The Paradigmatic Case of Reputation 
The situation completely changes when we move on from closed to open multi-agent 
systems. Open multi-agent systems can be pragmatically defined as systems where 
the behaviour of the agents involved is not developed and is not completely controlled 
by one designer or one designer team (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2002: 246). More 
precisely, open multi-agent systems are characterized by one or both of the following 
attributes: They are systems with open membership, in which every designer or user 
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who wants his agent to become a participant, in principal may do so (cf. Schulz-
Schaeffer 2000: 17-21). And/or the (or some of the) agents involved may be subject to 
emergent properties. In other words, in the course of their ‘life’ agents are able 
autonomously to change their patterns of behaviour, for instance by ‘learning’ from 
prior experiences. The growing interest in research in open multi-agent systems 
mainly results from the consideration that there will be a lot of promising applications 
in the domain of agent-based web services, which presuppose open systems at least in 
the sense that all agents, which are authorized by their users to engage in certain 
transactions may possibly become cooperation partners. 
With respect to the question of inter-agent coordination, the most important 
consequence of the two aspects related to openness is that agents now are – as Hewitt 
(1986: 322; 1991: 81-82) calls it – “at an arm’s length relationship”. This means that 
the “internal operation, organization, and state of one computational agent may be 
unknown and unavailable to another agent” (Hewitt 1986: 322) so that the agents 
know about one another only what they communicate to others. Since these agents act 
only according to their respective designers’ or users’ specifications (or in the case of 
emergent features: according to their own advancement of such specifications), there 
is no way to ensure collaboration by means of pre-established structures. Rather, 
nothing else but the negotiations between the agents account for success or failure of 
an agent’s attempt to initiate coordinative interaction.10 Thus, agents in open multi-
agent systems are confronted with the coordination problem as characterized by our 
general framework. 
I have argued that in the absence of pre-established coordination structures the only 
means a self-governed entity has to evoke another self-governed entity’s cooperation 
is to motivate this entity to act in a certain way by making conditional commitments. 
Additionally, I have tried to show that this solution to coordination problems has an 
inherent tendency to become more and more generalized and institutionalised, thereby 
removing some of the restrictions of the initial situation, in which alter when deciding 
whether to follow a suggestion he is asked to adopt can consider nothing more but 
ego’s conditional commitments. If this is true, similar ideas and efforts should be 
observed in research on open multi-agent systems. 
Indeed, in the last decade we have witnessed a lot of pioneering work in 
establishing commitment as a basic concept of coordination between agents (see for 
example Bond 1990; Cohen/Levesque 1990; Jennings 1993; Castelfranchi 1995). In 
this period, some researchers have even gone so far as to claim that “(a)ll coordination 
mechanisms can ultimately be reduced to (joint) commitments and their associated 
(social) conventions” (Jennings 1993: 234). Within a few years the concept of 
coordination through commitments made by agents, according to Castelfranchi and 
Conte, has become the dominant view: “No preexisting relationships, no objective 
bases, no specific motivations for cooperation are supposed in the agents, no 
obligations and constraints, except their free commitments, are thought to be put on 
them.” (Castelfranchi/Conte 1996: 537) Its wide acceptance can be underlined by the 
                                                          
10 Again, the only given structure that has to be presupposed is the existence of a common 
language, that is, of a communication protocol such as KQML (cf. Finin et al. 1993; 
Labrou/Finin 1997) or the agent communication language of the FIPA (cf. 
http.//www.fipa.org), which is being used by all agents, participating in communication, to 
make sure that suggestions and responses are properly understood. 
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somewhat exaggerated assertion that “(t)ypically, multi-agent systems … use 
centrally the concept of commitment” (Aubé/Senteni 1996: 13). 
In accordance with the considerations above regarding the motivating conditional 
commitment as the first step towards coordination, it has been emphasized that an 
agent’s commitment should be thought of as a social commitment in the sense of a 
promise to act in a way another agent is interested in (or is interested in to prevent), 
that is, as a “(c)ommitment of one agent to another” (Castelfranchi 1995: 41, cf. ibid.: 
42-45), but that it is based on an “internal commitment” (Cohen/Levesque 1990: 
257): that the agent commits itself to act in this way (cf. Jennings 1993: 236). 
Likewise, it is seen that “(w)ith respect to coordinating the behavior of multiple 
agents, the most important feature of commitments is that they enable individuals to 
make assumptions about the actions of other community members. They provide a 
degree of predictability to counteract the uncertainty caused by distributed control” 
(ibid.: 240), that is, caused by the fact that the agents involved are self-governed 
entities. 
However, most of the early approaches assume ‘good faith’, postulating that 
“agents commit only to what they believe themselves capable of, and only if they 
really mean it” (Shoham 1993: 64; cf. Jennings 1996: 195; Castelfranchi 1995: 45), 
allowing obligations to be revoked only after “explicit release of the agent by the 
party to which it is obliged”, or when it turns out that the agent “is no longer able to 
fulfill the obligation” (Shoham 1993: 65; cf. Cohen/Levesque 1990: 254-256) In the 
meantime it has become widely recognized that in open systems this good faith 
assumption is as unrealistic as the benevolent agent assumption of the early days was 
(cf. Rosenschein/Genesereth 1988: 227), since it does not take into account the 
possibility of incompetence or fraud. Consequently, the question of how to enable 
agents to assess other agents’ trustworthiness in order “to make our agents less 
vulnerable to others’ incompetent or malevolent behavior” (Marsh 1994: 97), has 
become a major topic in multi-agent research (see for example Castelfranchi/Falcone 
1998). In particular, much research has been done in recent years on reputation 
mechanisms (cf. Conte/Paolucci 2002). 
This interest in reputation has much to do with its emergent properties. For 
researchers who fear that pre-designed coordination structures might reduce the 
autonomous problem-solving capacities of interacting agents, but who nevertheless 
acknowledge that there is a need for means to reduce coordination problems, it is an 
intriguing idea that such a means of coordination may “emerge from a spontaneous 
process” (Conte 2001), that is, from the accumulated past experiences one agent has 
made with another agent, or additionally, from the accumulated recommendations of 
other agents reflecting their experiences with the performance of this agent. Thus, it is 
the property of being “an intrinsic enforcing mechanism” that does not need to be 
“controlled by a given external entity”, but is controlled “by the whole group” (ibid.), 
that makes reputation being viewed as a promising means of coordination between 
autonomous agents. In accordance with the considerations regarding generalized 
media of cooperation, multi-agent simulations have shown that the effectiveness of 
the reputation mechanism grows in line with its generalization. For example, 
Castelfranchi, Conte, and Paolucci (1998) have compared two experimental settings 
with respect to the ability of ‘respectful’ agents (i.e. those who follow a certain norm) 
to identify ‘cheating’ agents (i.e. those who do not). In the first setting the agents 
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learn about other agents’ behaviour only from their own experiences, in the second 
setting they exchange their experiences. The result of the simulation is not surprising 
(in the second setting the agents are much better in identifying cheaters), but clearly 
shows the use of accumulating experiences, and that means: the use of transforming 
individual evaluations into general indicators of agents’ performance. 
8 Closing Remark: The Need to Hybridise Open Multi-agent 
Systems 
In the previous section I have dealt with the general framework of analysing 
coordination problems between self-governed entities, starting from commitments as 
the only means to motivate another self-governed entity’s cooperation. I have tried to 
show how it may enhance our understanding of coordination problems between 
agents in open multi-agent systems and how it may help to identify impediments to 
coordination in open systems as well as the respective means of coordination that 
have emerged in human societies to deal with them. Obviously, in addition to the 
problem of whether to trust in an agent’s commitments, there are a lot of further 
impediments to coordination posed by the initial situation of double contingency. 
Thus, identifying processes where more general means of coordination emerge from 
conditional commitments may in this respect prove to be of help to overcome 
problems of coordination in open multi-agent systems. 
However, modelling coordination mechanisms between agents on conditional 
commitments and their emergent generalizations raises a problem that should not be 
ignored. I have argued that an important aspect of the generalized media’s capabilities 
to facilitate cooperation is that they allow to substitute reliance on individual actors’ 
intentions or resources by reliance on institutions. The more these means of 
coordination are symbolically generalized, the more important (and the more 
efficient) this institutional background becomes: Fiat money ultimately relies on the 
capability of the society’s central bank to prevent inflation or deflation; political 
power in the end relies on the capability of the state to hold the legitimate monopoly 
of force. This leads to the question of how ultimately to ensure the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the institutions supporting coordination in open multi-agent 
systems. 
So far, this question has been answered with reference to the self-adjusting 
properties and to the intrinsic enforcing mechanisms of emergent institutions. For 
example, the agent who does not stick to his commitments in the long run will gain a 
bad reputation, and, consequently, will be avoided by other agents. But these intrinsic 
properties fail to prevent certain malpractices: a user might employ the strategy to 
always kill his or her agent after having gained a bad reputation and create a new one. 
Or he or she might choose to create additional agents who deceptively recommend 
this agent’s trustworthiness so that it will gain a good reputation (cf. Spiegel Online 
2003). It should be obvious that malpractices of this kind cannot be avoided by means 
of coordination mechanisms, which only affect the behaviour of the agents. Rather, 
institutional arrangements are required to make sure that what affects an agent affects 
its user as well. To this end, access rules to open systems and rules regarding the 
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users’ responsibility for their agents behaviour have to be established. If only for this 
reason (in fact, there other good reasons, too, cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2001), research on 
open multi-agent systems necessarily leads to research on hybrid systems, that is, on 
systems of interaction among and between computational agents and human actors. 
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